Against the backdrop of the increasingly politically contaminated issue over Polish name-spelling, the relationship between Poland and Lithuania has, despite futile attempts by leading politicians on both sides to gloss over the problem, encountered a crisis more severe than anything that has been witnessed since the break-up of the Soviet Union. Irregardless of who is to blame for the deteriorating relationship between these two alleged neighbours; historically wedded confederates and, which has frequently been referred to in the media: strategic partners, the idea of a reinvigorated Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth based on the modern principle of mutual respect for national sovereignty and equality seems to be moribund to say the least.
Notwithstanding the conjugal historical and, albeit to a lesser extent, cultural heritage uniting the two countries; does this really constitute a solid basis for a reciprocally favourably political relationship? If one is to judge from recent developments, the answer would definitely be that these ties are not enough. What, in this context, adds insult to injury is the signing of a strategic partnership which was envisioned to cement the mutual importance the signatory states attributes to each others cooperation and "incontestable” friendship.
I do believe that the issue concerning Lithuania’s strategic partnerships is worth to dwell on; especially so since its alleged partners seems to constitute a more severe political headache than those choosing to conduct bilateral cooperation within the confines of the old-fashioned framework for foreign relations. Indeed, apart from Poland, Lithuania’s relation with France, also a strategic partner, have been tainted with minor conflicts during recent years.
The most recent example was when France concluded a backroom deal with Russia, basically over the head of its strategic partner, concerning the selling of Mistral helicopter carriers. Though the fears expressed by some Lithuanian commentators, going as far as to suggest that the ships could be used against "projected enemies in the Baltic States”, may appear grossly exaggerated, France’s strategy of neglecting to inform its partner about all the shady details concerning the deal was, nevertheless, rightfully perceived by Lithuania to be nothing short of a slap in the face.
With this in mind, one might ask why Lithuania, or any other state for that matter, chose to conduct bilateral relations under the aegis of a "strategic partnership”. What does this quixotic phrase actually imply in political terms?
If to consult the solemn and voluminous document ratifying the Polish-Lithuanian strategic partnership for an answer to this question we will definitely end up disappointed. What we get is an endless amount of references to increased cooperation in a multitude of political and economic sectors based on "common values and national equality”. However, is it really necessary to solemnly confirm this through the signing of an extremely formalized bilateral treaty? And, more importantly, is it not true, put in other words, that the corrosion of common values and the lack of respect for national sovereignty is partly to blame for the deteriorating relationship between Poland and Lithuania?
France is interesting in this perspective. To be sure, Lithuania is far from the only country that has signed a bilateral strategic partnership with this influential political and cultural European powerhouse. Indeed, ever since the break-up of France’s colonial empire in the aftermath of the Gaullist takeover, the country has systematically signed so-called bilateral strategic partnerships with a plethora of remote former colonies in the developing world. Occasionally, internal and external voices has raised concerns that France is using the ambiguous term of "strategic partnership” to, in a neo-colonial fashion, politically and economically re-establish its ties with these countries. Irregardless of whether these accusations are true or not, Lithuania and a few other smaller states, unburden by a colonist past, has chosen to follow the path of France’s former colonies.
If we then turn our heads eastwards, Russia constitutes another ardent supporter of conducting foreign relations within the framework of bilateral strategic partnerships. In the case of Russia, strategic partnerships are primarily, albeit not exclusively, signed with former member states of the Soviet Union, and they generally involve economic concessions, codified explicitly or implicitly, on the part of the signatory state.
Armenia, in particular, have accused Russia of resorting to neo-colonialist practices as their alleged "partnerships”, in their mind, basically functions to restore the dependency of the Armenian economy on the capricious Russian "petrocracy”. As such, under the auspices of "strategic partnerships”, Russia seems to take steps aimed at resuscitating the dismantled and compromised COMECON, although foreign relations this time is taking the shape of formalized bilateral agreements; ostensibly signed between political equals.
The Nordic states constitutes another interesting example as these countries, with a few interesting exceptions, abandoned the practice of signing bilateral "strategic partnerships” in the aftermath of the fall of the Berlin Wall. In the post-war era, however, the Nordic countries signed several bilateral "strategic partnership agreements” with various ostensibly independent communist regimes located in Central and Eastern Europe. Because of ideological incompatibility, references to "common values” were largely omitted, and the "partnerships” were basically aimed to alleviate cultural and economic exchange. As such, these agreements, although hardly worth calling "partnerships”, were, unlike its Lithuanian counterparts, truly strategic in essence.
According to political scientists in the Nordic countries, the reason for abandoning the practice of conducting foreign relations within the framework of strategic partnerships was, essentially, that the collapse of the ominous bipolar world order and the growing international integration in conjunction with an ever increasing impact of globalization was making bilateral strategic partnerships redundant. A smaller state, they argue, can gain nothing from signing such a partnership with a state of similar size and economic power, while partnerships signed with a so-called partner enjoying significantly larger economic and political strength simply and inevitably would subjugate the smaller state to its whims.
Whether one would agree that bilateral strategic partnerships constitutes a highly inefficient or outmoded way of conducting foreign relations or not, it is virtually impossible to negate the fact that Lithuania’s choices of partners have, with the wisdom of hindsight, been particularly ill-advised and politically short-sighted. Accordingly, the main problem, it seems, is that the "common values”, originally perceived to unite the signatory states, are indeed volatile and likely to fluctuate over time. Constituting the ideological platform for such an agreement, the so-called "values”, eulogized by one government may, and the examples are ample, be swept under the carpet or even publicly disclaimed after the loss of power in a subsequent election.
Ukraine is an interesting case in point as the country, in the aftermath of Yanukovych’s accession to power, seems to be turning its back on those cardinal democratic values espoused during the heyday of the Orange revolution. Now, however, Ukraine appears to be re-gravitating towards the Russian orbit, and tacitly institutionalizing a homespun variant of "sovereign democracy”; originally engineered by and successfully implemented in Russia. Notwithstanding these democratic shortcomings, Ukraine, too, is yet another state which has signed a strategic partnership with Lithuania, ostensibly based on the principle of "common political values”.
Fredrik Rydström is a distinguished academic from Sweden who graduated Vilnius University in Spring 2010. He has lived for almost two years in Lithuania where he found true love: the kibinas. Fredrik has held several lectures about and specialized in Baltic-Nordic relations
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